Organizational mess - the SOF case (unclassified)

I have been interested in issues in multi-dimensional organizational structures for quite a while. The problems related to matrix-style organizations, such as the inherent conflict between the two dimensions (LoB vs projects), are well known to organizational researchers and practitioners alike.

Basically, a matrix organization is a project-type structure that is superimposed on a functional structure. It is often used in organizations where certain expertise must be grouped for complex short- or long-term projects. Teams are formed with staff assigned from functional units, and when the initiative is complete, people would return to their respective groups.

The idea of the matrix organization is to maintain the characteristics of classical design (division of labor, centralization of authority, unity of control, and unity of direction) while adding the flexibility to work on critical projects. However, using a matrix approach might render conflicts between the different dimensions and these conflicts might include disputes about budgets and funding, authority, control, and accountability. And things get worse, if there are not only 2 dimensions, but even more, thus turning the matrix into a n-dimensional vector.

This can be exemplified by the United Combatant Commands (UCCs) in the US Armed Services. A UCC is a joint military command consisting of forces from two or more service branches (Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines). The purpose of establishing UCCs was to provide a more effective command and control structure where coordination and collaboration across branches was required either at functional or geographical level. Consequently, UCCs can have a geographical (AFRICOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, ...) or functional (STRATCOM, SOCOM, TRANSCOM) focus. The UCCs also report directly to the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), and not into any of the branches' command structures. A special role is played by SOCOM (Special Operation Command), which is the only UCC with acquisition authorities.

USSOCOM oversees the training, doctrine, and equipping of all U.S. SOF (Special Operations Forces) units and was established in 1986/87 in response to concerns about the status of SOF within defense planning. In particular, the experiences from operational shortcomings due to lack of coordination between SOF units from different services and the potential funding conflicts between SOFs and regular forces within the services resulted in Congressional measures to strengthen the SOF position. USSOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, FL. USSOCOM has approximately 54,000 active duty, Reserve and National Guard Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to the headquarters, its four components and one sub-unified command, and has an annual budget of ~8.5 b$. (Source: SOCOM presentation)

SOCOM command structure As depicted above, SOCOM has four subordinated commands that comprise the SOFs coming from the different branches (AFSOC - Air Force, ASOC - Army, NAVSOC - Navy, MARSOC - Marines) and a joint subcommand (JSOC), containing the so called special mission units (SMUs), most notably Army 1st SPF Operational Detachment Delta (aka Delta Force or Combat Applications Group) and DEVGRU (Naval Special Special Warfare Development Group). In addition, there are regional Special Operations Commands attached to the regional UCCs (e.g. SOCEUR - Special Operations Command Europe attached to EUCOM - European Command). This means, in peacetime there are three dimensions to the organizational structure of SOCOM: The SOCOM internal command structure, the regional UCCs, and the service branches. This already brings up a variety of questions, such as:

• Are SOFs that are located in specific regions under the primary command of SOCOM or the regional UCC?
• How are commands over CJSOTFs (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces, i.e. SOF Task Forces with members from different branches) distributed to give each branch a "fair share" of the available commands and related promotion opportunities?
• How can it be ensured that SOF capabilities within the different service components do not overlap, but are developed in a complementary way?

These kinds of issues are debatable and in peacetime, they are interesting topics for meetings. However, if theater operations are taken into account, they are becoming critical to operational success. Considering that there are additional theater specific command structures, as seen in Afghanistan with the CFSOCC-A (Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command) and the CJOSTF-A (Combined Joint Operations Task Force), there are four dimensions to the SOF organizational structure.

Four dimensions influencing SOF in Afghanistan

The above graphic does not take into account the fact that SOFs might need to coordinate with other, non-SOFs, and coalition forces and commands at theater level.

It seems obvious that, with this kind of multi-dimensional structure, it becomes increasingly difficult to set-up clear command and control (C2) structure and to establish operational efficiency and effectiveness.

BTW, the Strategies Studies Institute has published an interesting article on the problem of unified command structures, or rather the lack thereof, in Afghanistan. I had no knowledge of this paper when I wrote this post, but obviously the author has similar concerns. You can find it here: Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A forsaken principle of war.